International legal safeguards against the misuse of nuclear materials. by Jenkins, Allan, M.P.P.
I 
I 
J 
l 
\ 
/ 
1 
Alan Jenkins 
International Legal Safeguards Against The Misuse 
Of Nuclear Materials 
' 
Research Paper For Internationa.l Law LL.M (LAWS 517/518) 
( for MPP) 
Law Faculty 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Wellington 1978 

Section 1. 
Section 2. 
Section 3. 
Section 4. 
Section 5. 
Section 6. 
Section 7. 
' 
2 
Content..§ 
The Position Of Safeeuards In International 
Law: An Overview. 
The Foundations Of International Safeguards. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency And 
Safeguards. 
A. The Statute 
B. The Initial Safeguards Regimes 
IAEA Safeguards And The Treaty On The Non-
Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons. 
A. rrhe New Safeguards l~gime 
D. The Concept Of Pursuit 
'rhe Implications Of The NPT. 
A. The Position Of The Nuclear Powers 
B. The "Balanced Obligations11 Undertaking 
c. The Incentives Aspect, And Sanctions 
D. The "Security Assurances" Aspect 
'l'he Mechanics Of Present IAE.A Safeguards. 
A. Book-Keeping Controls 
B. Inspection Controls 
'l'he Nuclear Supplie r States And NPT Oblie-
a tions. 
.'I Clui 
td 
[r I l y OF- w LLING ON UH'/ ' 
Section 8. 
Section 9. 
Section 10. 
Conclusion. 
3 
The Non-Nuclear Recipient States. 
A. General 1 ttitudes 
B. The Treaty On 1rhe Pro hi bi tion Of Nuclear 
Weapons In Latin America: Safeguards Aspects 
The NPr 1,s Failings, And The Emergence Of 
The 'London Group'. 
The Post-London Group Era. 
Annex 1. Nucleir Power Ge ner a tion Technol ogy. 
J 
l 
' 
4 
1 • The Position Of Safeguards In International Law·: 
An Overview. 
The expression 11 international legal safeguards against 
the misuse of nuclear materials" embraces two separate 
areas of international law. On the one hand, there is 
the narrow definition of nuclear safeguards, ie. a system 
of international checks designed to discourage the diver-
sion of nuclear materials to unauthorised uses, and to 
detect any such diversion. On the other, there is the 
issue of liability for damage arising from any misuse. 
This second aspect normally is divorced from any study of 
safeguards per~ because it relates to legal provisions 
'after the event". Consequently, it has not been given 
any attention in this paper although it is worth mentioning 
that a weighty structure of nuclear inde::nity legislation 
exists at the international level and that this could act 
as a deterrent to the misuse of nuclear materials in cert-
ain circumstances. 
The purpose of safeguards has been defined by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (I/I.EA) as "the timely detect-
ion of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear 
material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufact-
ure of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices 
or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion 
by the risk of early detection 11 • * The funda ;nental safe-
guard measure reco gnised by the Agency is ma terial aocount-
ancy, "with containment and surveillance as important 
* INFCIRC/153(28) 
' 
5 
complementary measures 11 • "Containment" means the use of 
physical controls - walls, locks, seals, etc - designed to 
prevent illegal diversion, while "surveillance" involves 
guards, inspection and access to all facilities and systems 
where nuclear materials are handled. 
The extension of the safeguards concept to cover adequate 
physical control, as well as surveillance, has involved the 
acceptance of a new level of international constraints (the 
nearest parallel could be the use of peace-keeping forces 
in potential war zones). While simple verification through 
inspection and reporting has been an established principle 
in international treaties, little precedent has existed fof 
states to actually be told how they should go about ensuring 
that their obligations are complied with. To illustrate 
this point, the ICAO Convention, for example, sets out 
specific conditions to be fulfilled by aircraft operating 
in member states*. However, states are not required to 
accept these standards internally under threat of being 
denied air links with member nations; the onus to implement 
adequate controls is presented as a common ideal of contract-
ing parties (and any state is free to allow aircraft to 
operate over its territory under any separate or less 
stringent conditions it may lay down). In co~trast, the 
evolving system of international nuclear safeguards 
increasingly abrogates the sovereignty of contracting 
states over the way nuclear materials are handled internally. 
* ICAO Convention, l 944, chapter II. l 2; chapter V. 
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As an example. a state wishing to obtain, say. 10Kg of 
nuclear fuel from a supplier would be likely to find: 
a) that this meant accepting international scrutiny of 
its entire peaceful nuclear programme, possibly indefinit-
ly; b) that no alternative supplier would offer more 
favourable conditions; and c) that supplies would be 
withheld or withdrawn if it engaged in certain areas of 
peaceful research. 
The strict regimes of material accountancy administered 
by the IAEA, both under its original safeguards system and 
that established by the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nu clear '!ieapons ( NPT), also overstep the conventional 
limi t s of international interference in domestic affairs. 
States accepting nuclear ma terials for peaceful purposes 
on such terms are not free to use or redistribute these as 
they see fit, they must keep an inventory of the whereabouts 
and use t o which these are put for as long as they remain 
within their territory. They do not, in effect, ever 
11 own11 such materials c ompletely. Furthermore; the systems 
of supply restrictions established by the 'London Group' 
(the major nuclear supplier nations) and the 1 209 Group' 
(those states which have announced formally that they will 
prohibit the export of nuclear goods to nations which do 
not accept Agenc y safeguards) probably have no counterpart 
in the non-nucl ear trade field (and would, in fact, be 
viewed as collusive or re s trictive practices in nor,aal 
trad e law). 
Going beyond the surrender of sove reignty invo lved in 
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internati·.rnal safeguads, there also is a tendency for 
specific controls or moderating arrangements instituted by 
individual states or groups of states to be internationalised 
simply because of the relationship with nuclear issues. 
This occurs through the process of norm-building on 
which international nuclear law is based. Thus, recent 
decisions by countries such as the United States to halt 
the commercialisation of more risky nuclear energy programmes, 
along with a move by particularly concerned nations to 
discuss ways in which nuclear energy can be disseminated 
without increasing the likelihood of nuclear weapons 
proliferation (through participation in the 'International 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation' - INFCE - programme) contribute 
to the establishment of a concensus in this area. The 
stronger the concensus reached, the ::iore binding will be 
any international legislation covering the subjects involved. 
The facility, and relative haste, with which new norms are 
identified and transcribed into international legislation 
is a unique feature of nuclear safeguards, reflectin0 both 
the urgency of the problem and the power of the resources 
being brought into play to prevent nuclear proliferation. 
Yet another area where the safeguards concept is break-
ing new ground in international law involves efforts, 
particularly by the ilnited States, to freeze international 
commerce in facilities for the production of nuclear power 
by what are considered to be more 11 dangerous 11 methods in 
terms of prolif eration risks (eg. the nuclear fuel and energy 
cycles based on plutonium, an element which can be used for 
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the manufacture of nuclear we apons without further refining: 
see Annex 1 ) • Attempts to create international concensus 
o~ this issue, and also - through unilateral and multilateral 
action - to prevent states from engaging in the peaceful 
development of nuclear energy in such areas, call for a 
further surrender of sovereignty by acceding nations. 
Going even beyond this, such attempts also mean that those 
nations which are pioneering research into the "dangerous" 
fuel/energy cycles are entitled, by concentrating ,their 
efforts on making such systems safer (presumably through 
massive inputs of money and technology) to reinforce their 
existing commercial monopolies while expecting the 
eventual recipient nations to bear many of the additional 
costs. 
This last point is central to the unique position of nuclear 
safeguards in international law. Because the objective 
of safeguards is to deny the vast bulk of nations access 
to weapons which an elite already possess, and also to deny 
them the uae of the option or threat to one day 11 go nuclear" 
unless their foreign policy objectives are satisfied, they 
are based on accepta nce of inequality. This is in sharp 
contrast to the Lasic premise of international law that 
all nations must be treated as equals. Efforts by the 
nuclear elite to com pensate for the unequal burden which 
other nations must assu~ e in accepting safeguards have 
emphasised compensatory 11 sacrifices 11 to get over this 
initial inequality. Such sacrifices involve bearing a 
disproportionate share of the cost of research into safeguards 
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and safe energy processes; attempting to agree among them-
selves to reduce their own nuclear arsenals; and giving 
guarantees of stable supplies of nuclear materials to 
nations which are denied the right to manufacture their 
own. 
The success of the international safeguards system may 
depend in part on the effectiveness of the compensatory 
sacrifices mentioned above. However, it can be argued: 
a) that any costs incurred in devising fail-safe mechanisms 
ultimately will be passed on to the consumer; b) that there 
are few realistic signs of any mutual phase-down of nuclear 
weaponry; and c) that no guarantees can overcome the event-
ual prospect of a run-down in available supplies of 11 safe11 
nuclear fuels. Also, there has been some evidence that the 
supplier nations have breached the trust placed in them by 
the safeguards system by refusing to supply more sensitive 
items to acceding states. The dicri~inatory aspects of 
international safeguards are dealt with in subsequent 
sections, as is the concept of reaching an "equilibrium of 
sacrifice" between the nuclear 'haves' and 'have-nots' 
through treaties and conventions. 
Aside frolll the issu es outlined above, the question of 
t}1e overall effectiveness of the safeguards system must be 
considered. States agree to comply with safegua rda in the 
belief that these will contribute to a low ered risk of 
nuclear proliferation. If it is evident that those 
countries most likely to want nuclear weapons a re able to 
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obtain the necessary materials, expertise and will , despite 
the costly sacrifices of the vast majority of states t hen 
the legal foundatmon of the safeguards system must be 
invalidated. Previous attempts to legislate internationally 
against behavior which offends supposed common norms 
(eg. the oil boycott against Rhodesia, which the United 
Kingdom now appears to have been circumventing) have tended 
to prove inadequate. The international regime of safeguards 
against nuclear proliferation can only be said to have 
substance if it can be seen to be working. 
One final point which must be borne in mind in considering 
the place of safeguards in international law is the import-
ance of the propaganda c omponent both in helping new 'norms' 
to crystallise and in persuading nations to accept the 
progressive surrender of sovereign rights beca use they believe 
the system already is proving itself. An analysis of the 
foreign policy stances of the key nations supporting safe-
guards is outside the scope of this paper. However, it is 
worth observing that the purpose and effectiveness of 
nuclear controls has been stresse d in recent official 
statements by members of the t1Su ppliers 1 Group" of nations 
(the London Group), particularly the USA. In contrast, 
those nations the safeguards system is attempting to 
restrain tend to be unanimous in their scepticism towards 
nuclear legal c ontrols. The relative ease with which 
India wa s able to mak e the transition from being a nuclear 
'have-not• to a 'have' (ie. without any overwhelming weight 
of sanctions being im posed) indicates that the safeguards 
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system applying up to 197L~, at least, did not live up to 
its reputation. 
India's example also may indicate that the supposed 
equality at least of non-nuclear nations under safeguards 
regimes is a myth: the relative susceptibility of different 
states to political pressure from the Great Powers may be 
far more effective than the safeguards system in deciding 
a) whether or not they will abuse their rights of access 
to nuclear materials, and b) wheth~r or not they will be 
punished for any such abuse. It is possible that the 
supposed inter~tional norms on which safeguards are based 
are only a legal veneer cov ering a conglomerate of threats 
and bribes which is constructed and maintained by the 
powerful nations. 
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2. The Foundations Of International Safeguards. 
While initial research into nuclear energy was cloaked in 
secrecy, this was for reasons of national security rather 
than to protect the common interests of the international 
community. Similarly, the November 1945 Tripartite Declar-
ation (the 'Three Nations Declaration', by the USA, UK and 
Canada\ stating that information concerning the industrial 
application of nuclear energy would not be relaased to other 
nations until "effective, reciprocal and enforceable safe-
guards11 acceptable to all had been drawn up and implemented, 
must be regarded as an attempt by the three allies to retain 
a mcnopoly on the bomb rather than as a seminal point in the 
development of safeguards (although it did contain the first 
use ot the term 11 safeguards11 in the nuclear context). 
The initial General Assembly resolution in 1945, which 
established the United Nations Atomic.. Energy Commission 
(UNAEC), incorporated part of the Tripartite Declaration in 
calling, inter alia, "for effective safeguards by way of 
inspection and other means •.• " against the spread of nuclear 
weapons. 
A subsequent attempt by the Tripartite powers to conceal 
their inflexible stance behind the 'Barach Plan'(put to the 
United nations in 1946 by the USA) also rested on a ban on 
nuclear activities by states rather than on the evolution 
of a system of controls which would enable the benefits of 
atomic power to be shared by other nations. Under this plan, 
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the USA would surrender control of all nuclear activities 
to an 'International Atomic Energy Autherity 1 which would 
be responsible for all nuclear research, and which would 
have powers to impose sanctions against any nation atte1~-
ing unilateral research. The 'catch-221 clause in the 
Barach Plan was a stipulation that the USA would retain 
sole control over its nuclear programme until effective 
11 veto-free 11 sanctions were operative (the Soviet Union 
refused to accept any curbs on its own nucleat research 
without "prior destruction of the US weapons stockpile", 
and the plan consequently failed). 
Lengthy debate in the UNAEC and the UN itself on the 
Barach Plan and various counter-proposals was overtaken 
by events as other nations developed and exploded their 
own atomic bo~bs, and as the prospects for international 
control of all nuclear activities vanished. By 1953 
factors such as the death of Stalin, the succciss of the 
UK in producing its own nuclear weapon despite being 
frozen out ot the post-War US nuclear programme and, 
especially, a mistaken belief that nuclear power would 
bec ome econo r.i ically viable in Europe before the USA, had 
combined to enc ourage the Eisenhower administration to 
yield to the inevita ble. The concept of total control 
was abandone d and, instead, the US began to think in 
terms of using its nuclear 'Jre-eminence as a bribe to 
channel other countries' research into peaceful areas. 
The "A toms for Peace'' proposal which Eisenhower presented 
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to the General Assembly in December 1953 involved the 
establishment of an international atomic energy agency 
which would be allocated stocks of nuclear material, and 
which would oversee the internationalising of research 
into peaceful u s es of nucl ear energy. The concept of 
s a f e guards, while not mentioned in the proposal, was 
L :t ~) lici t in the structure o f the a gency envisaged. In 
support of this initiative, the US relaxed its export 
prohibition on nuclear materials (through the Atomic Energy 
Act 1954), declassified a numb e r of processes and began to 
accept loose bilatera l guarantees of "peaceful use" as 
the criterion for dis s e mination of uranium. 
With the Ato~s f o r Peace move, the US in effect offered 
to as s ist with the acc e lerated development of n uclear 
programmes in othe r nations, in return for the international 
recognition of the conditions under which such programmes 
would proceed. Acceptance of the pro posal, and the 
establishment of the IAEA in 1957, marked the first success-
ful efforts t o persuade nations that the potential benefits 
from nuclear ene rgy were sufficient (and the risks grave 
enough) to warrant the intrusion of safeguards into their 
sovereignty. It should not be ove~looked that the Tri-
partite Proposal nations had separately developed profit-
able and increasingly ~restigious nuclear export industries 
by 1957, meaning that a numbe r of ~rejects had escaped the 
IA£A safeguards net even then, and that the commercial 
desirability of a common safeguards regime had become 
apparent, regardless of any higher justification. 
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3. ~he International Atomic Energy Agency And Safeguards. 
A. The Statute 
The safeguards provisions of the IAEA Statute resulted 
from lengthy debate and involved a strong element of 
compromise. Consequently, they tend to be fairly general. 
Article II requires the Agency to "ensure, so far as it is 
able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or 
under its supervision or control is not used in such a way 
as to further any military purpose". Article III.A.5 
empowers the IAEA 11 to establish and administer safeguards 
desig ned to ensure that special fissioable and other materials, 
services, facilities and info rmation made available by the 
Ag ency, or at its r e quest or under its supervision or 
control are not used in such a way as to furth e r any military 
purpose", and to apply safeguards: 
a) In connection with its own assistance Programmes 
(so-called 'Agency projects'); 
b) At the request of the parties to any bilateral or 
multilateral arrange ment; and 
c) At the request of any state with regard to its own 
territory. 
Article XI.F.4 stipulates tha t any state engaging in an 
Agency proj ect must make a legal undertaking not to use 
the assistance so provided to further any military purpose, 
and to accept the safeguards which the Agency lays down. 
16 
The final parts of the Statute dealing with safeguards are 
Article XII (which specifies the Agency's powers to require 
inventories to be kept, to review security procedures at 
facilities, and to take similar measures to prevent the 
diversion of materials under its control for military 
purposes), and Article XIV (which includes the cost of 
safeguards under the Agency's administrative expenses, 
where this is not provided for under separate agreements)* 
The Statute makes it clear that the automaticity of the 
Barach Plan (ie. safeguards applying automatically to all 
national research when it moved into the nuclear area) had 
been abandoned at this stage, and that the IAEA would only 
be able to intervene when specifically requested to do so 
by the states involved. 
The only sanctions provided for in the Statute are the 
withdrawal of IAEA sponsorship, and requests for the return 
of material which has been supplied to offending states. 
Any further action is left entirely to the United Nations, 
with the Agency's Board of Governors being required to 
report non-compliance to both the Security Council and the 
General Assembly. 
* B. Sanders & Ha Vinh Phuong 'International Safeguards', 
in HLB No 1.3 (Dec 1976) cove r the Agency's Statute in 
more depth. 
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B. The Initial Safeguards Regimes 
The general responsibility of the IAEA to provide safe-
guards when these are required by separate bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements (Article III.A.5) made it highly 
desirable for a standard list of procedures to be drawn up 
which theoretically dould be applied, with minor modificat-
ions, in all cases. 'rhe first attempt at this, 'The Agency 
Safegu.ards System (1961)' - INFCIRC/26 - was a tentative 
effort aimed solely at small research reactors (there was 
sorne doubt among suppliE::r nations at that stage whether 
controls administered by an international agency would be 
as effective as those specified under the bilateral 
co-operation agreements then beinc en tcred into. The impetus 
to produ.ce IilFCIRC /26 came particularly from a 1958 
application by Japan for IAEA assistance in obtaining 
nuclear fuel for a research reactor. The Japanese agreed 
in principle to accept any Agency safeguards which might be 
considered necessary). 
In 1965 INFCIRC/26 was extended to cover all nuclear 
reactors (INFCIRC /66), and it was revised in 1966 and again 
in 1968 to cover a full range of nuclear facilities and 
materials , including reprocessing and fuel fabrication 
plants . fiince 1968 the basic IAEA safeguards document 
has been I tlF'CIHC /66/Rev. 2, and a 11 ac;reements made under 
the Agency's aec;is between 1968 and the introduction of the 
I!P'r safeguards regime in 1970 ( and bcyarl then for non-NPT 
' 
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signatories) have been in terms of this document. A few 
early agreements made under the less specific arrangements 
of I NFC IRC/26 have lingered on but the tendency has been 
for these to be phased out in favour of tte provisions agreed 
on by the Agency in 1968. 
In addition to INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, supplementary provision 
for inspections is made in a separate document entitled 
'The Agency I s Inspectorate' ( document GC-V-HfF /39), given 
effect in 1961. 
The actual application of Agency safeguards began in 
1961 but involved only Agency projects, covering materials 
made available by or through the Agency. However, from 
1962 onwards the USA - with the agreement of the other 
nation invo lved in each case - began to transfer to the 
IAEA the safeguards responsibilities provided for in its 
own bilateral nucl ear co-operation arrangements. In 1963 
the USSR, acknowledging with regret that the dissemination 
of nuclear materials was a fact of life, strongly supported 
the concept of a uniform c ode of IAEA safeguards for all 
recipient countries. 
The above moves by the two Super Powers mar ked the beginn-
ing of a whole series of 'safeguards transfer agreements', 
or trilateral agre ements between the individual states 
involved and the Agency as provided for in Article III.A,5 
of the Statute. Similarly, a nu mber of nations have since 
unilaterally submitted t hei r nuclear activities to Agency control. 
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IAEA Safeguards And The Treaty On The Non-Prolifer-
ation Of Nuclear ~eapons. 
A. The Hew Safeguards Regime 
As the Agency's safeguards arrangements were evolving, 
the United Nations made parallel efforts to place direct 
curbs on the actualronstruction of nuclear weapons by states 
which had not already done so. Beginning with a 1958 
resolution (presented by Ireland), the text of the NPT was 
drawn up by the Assembly's Disarmament Committee and adopted 
by an overwhelming vote (95 for, 5 against and 21 abstent-
ions) in 1968 (entering into force, after the necessary 
ratifications, in March 1970). Essentially, states party 
to the IWT undertake not to develop (if tbey have not 
already done so) or assist in the devebpment of nuclear 
weapons or nuclear explosives. Moreover, •·non-weapons' 
signatories agree to put all their nuclear facilities 
under safeguards to ensure that the risk of proliferation 
is minimised (this undertaking covers facilities developed 
domestically, as well as imports). 
Under the HPT, states with nuclear weapons - 'nuclear 
powers' - agree not to transfer these to non-nuclear states, 
and the treaty provideg for a neutral inspectorate tasked 
with identifying and exposing nny attempt to contravene 
this undertaking. The right of all signatories to engage 
in peaceful nuclear activities is underlined in the NPT 
' 
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but every non-weapons party is obliged to accept IAEA safe-
guards on all such activities under its control. The Treccy 
also contains an undertaking by all its parties not to 
supply sensitive equipment or nuclear materials for peaceful 
purposes to any non-weapons state, regardless of whether or 
not it is a party to the Treaty, unless these are made subject 
to the same safeguards. 
S pecifically, the key clauses of the NPrr dealing with 
safeguards appear in Article III.1 (where non-weapon 
parties agree to accept IAEA safeg uards); and Article III.2 
(extending IAEA safeguards to trade in nuclear materials etc). 
The NPI' does not have its own defined system of safeguards 
but relies on the IAEA to provide this. It thus reinforces 
the authority of the Agency. However, the greater e mphasis 
given to signatories1 rights to minimise the intrusive aspects 
of inspection a nd detection in the Treaty (concessions made 
by the pro-IWT powers in order to maximise its political 
acce p t a bility) necessitated an immediate review of the basic 
Agency safeguards system. This took the form of 'INFCIRC/153' 
entitled "The Structure and Content of Agreements Between 
the Agency and States Hequired in Connection 1.'/i th the IlPT". 
INFCIRC/153 has been the basis of all safl.eguards agreements 
so far concluded in connecti on with the NPT. 
The most i mp ortant distinctions between the Agency's 
original safe guards system (INF<.:I1<C/66/Rev.2) and t hat 
r e sulting fro m the NPT (I NFCIRC/153) are set out in the 
fallowing tab le. 
Subject 
eoverage. 
Activities 
specifically 
banned. 
Responsibilities 
of signatories. 
21 
Agency 
pafeguards 
Apply only as a 
result of the specific 
Agency projects, tri-
lateral agreements and 
unilateral agreements. 
None of the items cov-
ered by agreements are 
to be put to any milit-
ary purp:)se. 
The Agency itself in-
spects facilities sub-
ject to agreement 
periodically. 
Scope of inspect- Inspections concentrate 
ions. on specific facilities 
defined by each agree-
ment. 
' 
NPT 
Safeguards 
Apply automatically 
to all peaceful 
nuclear activities 
of signatories. 
Nuclear energy may 
not be used by non-
weapons signatories 
to produce explosives. 
However, it may be 
used for other milit-
ary purposes. 
States must establish 
their own systems of 
accounting and control, 
and the IAEA is em-
powered to verify thmir 
findings. 
Inspections cover all 
areas of the national 
peaceful nuclear 
programme. 
All HPl' safeguards are negotiated within the terms of 
INFCIRC/153, ·and this gives them a uniformity which the old 
INFC It<C/66/.Rev .2 arrangements lacked. Because of its 
greater demands, and its need for flexibility to meet varying 
circumstances, the earlier document does not contain the 
"structure and content 11 of agreements, whereas this is 
specified in IUFCIRC/153. 
' 
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The pre-NPT system gives various objectives and proceed-
ures for the application of safeguards but these must be 
further elaborated in the appropriate specific agree~ents. 
There is consid0rable flexibility over the extent to which 
the IAEA's provisions are incorporated in a particular 
agreement, and the safeguards aspects of such agreements 
need only be nesentially consistent" with those of Il'TFCIRC/ 
6 6/Rev. 2. A number of very basic points are left to the 
various specific agreements. These include notifications 
of materials transfers, the types of inventories and records 
which the Agency is to be required to keep, and the types 
of security measures to be applied. 
In order to secure as much standardisation as possible, 
the Agency evolved its own model 11Subsidiary Arrangements" 
covering the above points, and endeavoured to encourage 
states to couch specific agreements made under INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 
in terms of these. However, because of the highly technical 
nature of such Subsidiary arrangements, there was an inevit-
less 
able tendency for th~technically advanced nations to accept 
the IAEA's guidelines almost without m0dification but for 
the more advanced to tailor them to suit themselves. 
B. The Concept Of Tursuit 
One area where IAEA safeguards agreements outside the 
lJP'r have shown considerable variation has involved the 
process of "pursuit" (ie. of keeping track of used fuel and 
equipment and, especially, of the fissionable end-products 
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from some nuclear reactors). Pursuit involves both tracing 
subsequent exports of sensitive materials created in a 
facility vrliich is subject to safeguards, and monitoring 
the use t0 which such materials (and further generations of 
materials which may, in turn, be derived from these) are put. 
Such monitoring may be required indefinitely. 
The concept of pursuit is entrenched in the IAEA Statute, 
and expanded in INFCIHC/66/Rev.2 (paragraph 16) which states 
that it is desirable tha t agreements should provide for the 
continuation of safeguards for fissionable products. While 
many agreements do embrace the concept, or else make allowance 
for furth e r neeotiations on pursuit when they expire, others 
contain specific time limits and overlook the question of 
continued s afeguard s on sensitive materials which may have 
been produced in the course of a safeguarded operation's life-
time.* Tte IAEA in 1974 attempted to close the pursuit loophole 
by formally ann0uncing t hat it considered indefinite follow-
up of a ll nuclear products should "normallyrr be an essential 
featur e of future safeguards agreements. S ince then, this 
guideline seems to have been accepted but, given the added 
survei]ance co~plexi ty which pursuit creates , it is prema ture 
to judge the e f fe ctiveness of such provisions. The rapid expansion 
* 
of nuclear processes could soon make pursuit an imp~ssible burden. 
As e::xa:aples, the trilateral a ,3reemcrnt between India, Cana da 
and the Agency (I NFCIHC/211) for supply of ma terials for the 
Rajasthan power station applied for an initial period of only 
five y ears but specific provision was ruade for subsequent gen-
erations of nuclear material produ ced to be safeguarded indef-
initely . In contrast, the unilateral undertaking by Argentina 
to the Agency for the 1'.tucha power station ( INFCIRC/168) contains 
no provision for such follow-up surveillance. 
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The Implications Of The t~T . 
A. The Position Of The Nuclear Powers 
From the earlies\- stage s in its evolution , the NPT has 
been associated with the nuclear 'haves' of the world - and, 
particularly, with the United States and the USSR - and has 
been presented as a penn_lty which the 'have-nots' must pay 
in order to enjoy barmo nirus relations with the Great Powers. 
Initially, in August 1957, the Western powers (the USA, 
UK, Cana da and France) submitted a "package" of r.a easures to 
the sub-committee of the UN Disarmament Commission offering 
various c oncessions and calling for a parallel commitment 
by each UN member "not to transfer out of its control any 
nuclear v,eapons, or to acce p t transfer to it of such weapons" 
except for self defence. At the time the USSR cwosed this 
move, calling for a complete ban on the transfer of nuclear 
weapons and on the stationing of nuclear weapons in foreign 
countries (referring to the US nuclear preaence in Europe) . 
Conseque ntly, the "packa5e" offer was defeated. 
In 19 61 the General Assembly unanimously approved an 
Irish resolution calling on all states to readh formal 
agreement to refrain from the transfer or acquisition of 
nucl ear weapons. The success of this resolution, after 
the 1957 failure, can be attributed in part t o the USSR ' s 
belated recognition that its nuclear co o 0cration programme 
with China - which ended abruptly in 1960 - had been creating 
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a potentially hostile weapons state on its border (the 
first Chinese nuclear explosion occured in 1964). 
On 21 January 1964 the United States put an arms control 
proposal to the UN's Eighteen ~ation Disarmament Committee. 
This included a non-dissemination and non-acquisition clause, 
based on the 1961 resolution, together with safeguards on 
the transfer of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. 
An important feature was a call for the major nu.clear powers 
to accept that their peaceful nuclear activities increasingly 
undergo "the same inspection they recommend for other states". 
Despite implied Soviet support for the concept of non-
prolifcration, little more progress was made for some time. 
The US had been having talks with its IJATO allies on the 
possible creation of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF), 
and the USSR viewed this as a direct attempt at nuclear 
dissemination which precluded any form of non-proliferation 
agreement. The debate between the two Super Powers led 
to the tabling of separate draft non-proliferation treaties 
by each in 1965, the main features being a US move to have 
IAEA or equivaJent safeguards applied to all non-nuclear 
weapons signatd..ries, and a Soviet proposal (without safe-
guards provisions) which was aimed particularly at prohibiting 
the MLF. 
By 1966, despite continuing disagreement over the r:LF 
issue, it was clear that both sides supported further 
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movement towards an agreement on non-proliferation. Very 
significantly, the non-nuclear nations also were becoming 
heavily invvlved in the debate at this stage (as was 
demonstrated by a series of General Assembly resolutions 
urging priority attention for non-proliferation. 'i'he 1964 
African Summit Conference, and the subsequent Cairo 
Conference of Non-Aligned States, also produced strong 
calls for progress with nuclear weapons limitation). 
The US and USSR conferred throughout 1966, finally 
reaching agreement on a draft treaty (in the process, the 
US abandoned the MLF idea, and the Soviet side appears to 
have been equally conciliatory). This was presented, as 
joint drafts, to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee 
in August 1967 and, after a number of revisions based 
largely on concerns expressed by non-weapons states, was 
approved by the General Assembly in June 1968. 
Objections by the non-nuclear states included 
a) the commercial disadvantage arising from safeguards 
being placed on their development programmes when nuclear 
weapon state~ were being spared this burden (there is no 
FPT obligation for nuclear-weapon states to accept safe-
guards on their peaceful nuclear activities*). This 
* Under the old INFCIRC/66/Rcv.2 system the obligation of 
safeguards may arise if nuclear material is returned to a 
nuclear-weapon state in an "improved 11 - ie. weapons grade 
condition. 
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objection was partly overcome when the US A and the UK agreed 
to accept safeguards also; b) integra tion of the EEC's 
peaceful nucl ear programme, EURATOM, into the system; and 
c) the possible ~iscriminatory effect of safeguards. This 
last concern led to Articles IV and V of the NPT, guarant~ing 
signatories fr ee access to nuclear equipment, materials and 
technology. 
B. The "Balanced Obligations" Undertaking 
A key element in the final phase of the NPT negotiations 
was acc ep tance by th e nuclear powers t ha t they had an 
obligation to reduce their nuclear arsenals and to work towards 
progressive disarmament. The Preamble to the Treaty stresses 
intentions by parties 11 to achieve at the earliest possible 
date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake 
effective meas'1res in the dir e ction o:6. nuclear disarmament"; 
~ .• to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all t est explosions 
of nuclear weapons"; and 11 ••• to facilitate ... the liquidation 
of all their existing stoc'.cpiles, and the elimination fr0m 
national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their 
delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and co mplete 
disarmament under strict and effective international c o ntrol11 • 
These sentimonts are reit e rat ed s pecifical ly in Article VI. 
To many non-nuclear na.tions, the •~T was "a compact 
between nuclear-weapom powers and non-nuclear weapons 
states in which the latter accepted restraints on their 
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sovereignty in return for measures towards nuclear disarma-
ment by nuclear-weapons states"*. The very limited progress 
made towards this objectiv!F since 1970 (the SALT talks) 
may be viewed as a serious attempt by the USA and USSR to 
meet their side of the bargain. Conversely, it may be seen 
as a minimal effort designed to create the illusion of 
movement towards what is., in fact, an unattainable goal in 
the present political situation. 
C. The Incentives Aspect, And Sanctions 
The United States and the Soviet Union, in preparing 
their joint 1967 drafts, appear to have been cch,Scious that 
these would need to guarantee access to nuclear materials 
on a non-discriminatory basis if they were to obtain 
general endorsement. However, debate within the Disarmament 
Committee after the drafts were presented still highlighted 
the need for additional guarantees to this effect. Both 
the final drafting (within the Disarmament Committee) and 
the formulation of E.JFCIRC/153 accordingly were aimed at 
creating a safeguards regime that offered 11 better 11 (ie. less 
discriminatory) access rights than those established under 
the existing safeguards arrangements normally applied by 
the supplier nations. To this effect, the specific 
* Pakistan 1 s PerCTanent Representative to the Security Council, 
in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 16, 1977, 
p. 464 
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aspects of the old INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 system were replaced 
(for :tPT purposes) by a much more general set of commitments. 
The supplier states had been able to dictate ter~s to 
recipient countries over the areas where IAEA safeguards 
would be applied, the level of access for inspection, etc 
under the old system. In practise, although the desirability 
of uniformity was stressed, this meant that safeguards could 
be applied follr more intrusively to the "weak" nations whiuh 
were not in a position to threaten to find alternative sources 
(such as d omes tic manu f a cture), or to nations which the supplier 
did not fully trust. Under the NP.r regime, signatories were 
to be rewarded by being able· to conclude 11 easier11 and more 
acceptable I NFC IRC/153 agreements, whereas non-signatories 
v1 ould be f orc ed to a cce p t supplies only under Il'TFCIRC /6f/~ev. 2 
conditions. 
Provisions for the application of sanctions a gainst 
offending states as a result of the NPT are somewhat more 
positive tha n those provided for by the IAEA Statute. Agree-
men ts ~ade by the Agency with individual states or groups of 
states under t he conditions of the rWT are subject to a 
rule ( IHFCIRC/153, para.. 13 2d 9) that the IAEA Board of 
Governors oay decide, on the basis of a report from the 
'l}ir e ctor g eneral, to call on a party to take "essential and 
urgent" action to enable the Agency to verify that there has 
been no diversion (this rule can be administe red, for example, 
in cases of obstruction or denial of access). This means 
' 
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that t he Agency can react before there has been an obvious 
breach of an agreement, and can call for sanctions on the 
basis of a lack of information instead of being required 
to prove guilt. Simple failure to verify that no diversion 
has occured is considered sufficient to justify s anctions. 
How ever, the ac tu.al punitive powers available under the 
NPT still amount to only a public conde innation ( via the UN), 
a freeze on supplies of nuclear materials, and a righ t to 
demand the return of any such materials subject to the 
s pacific agreement involve d. 
India's nuclear test in ::ay 1974 brought home the weak-
ness of existing sanctions. India is not a nuclear-weapon 
state in the sense of the 1l"PT (Article IX.3 defines such 
nations as those which had manufactured and exploded a 
nuclear weapon or other nuclear device prior to 1967), 
and t he plutonium used to create the explosion was derived 
fro m a Canadian-supplied reactor. Reprocessing of the 
spent fuel was carried out in facilities constructed 
without outside assistance* As a non-NPT signatory, 
India was not obliged to apply IAEA safeguards affecting any 
part of its extensive do~estic nuclear industry, and the 
divers ion of small quantities of plutonium - ostensibly 
for peaceful purposes (India still maintains that its 1974 
e xplosio n was a test of a non-~ilitary explosive device) -
clearly did not prove i mpossible . 
* The re pr0c essing plant in Trombay. See W. Van Cleave, 
'Nuclear Technology~ Weapons', in ' Nuclear Pr0liferation 
Phase II' ed. H. H. La\'/rence/J. Larus, 19?Lh p. 30 . 
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The fact that no effective sanctions were applied to 
India after the eve nt (Canada ceased its nuclear cooperation 
programme with India as a result of the explosion but this 
has not prevented further substa.tial progress by the domestic 
nuclear industry, including construction of a 470-M~ nuclear 
power plant in hadras) demonstrates that the IAEA regime has 
limits to its enforcement functions. Efforts by concerned 
nations since J.iay 1974 have centred about pQI'suading India 
not to move any further towards developing a tactical bomb, 
arguably the the most reasonable approach under the circum-
stances*. Actions which might have alienated the Indians 
or generated sympathy for their position among Third World 
countries were generally avoided. Thus, in July 1976, the 
US Nuclear Regula tory Commission approved a licence to ship 
82 Kg of low-enriched uranium to India under a safeguarded 
agreement. 
D. The 11Securi ty Assura!llc es 11 Aspect 
In th e course of the nego tiations leading up to the 1IPT, 
non-nuclear weapons states sought assurances that renunciation 
of such armaments would not increase t heir military vulner-
ability. Many, such as Israel, argued that their peculiar 
security problems meant that the y would be required to make 
far bigger sacrifices than woulcl be required of others if 
they signed the Treaty. This particular debate led, on 
J.S. Nye 'Non-Proliferation: A Long-Term Strategy', in 
1 Foreign Affairs', April 1978 , p.612 makes this point with 
regard to US strategy towards India. 
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7 March 1968, to an independent submission to the Eighteen 
Nation Disar~ament Committee by the USA, UK and USSR aimed 
at providing "security assurances" to non-nuclear nations 
acceding to the proposed HPT. 
The assurances proposal called for a Security Council 
resolution which, noting the security concerns of states 
wishing to subscribe td the NPT, would recogn:i:)Se that 
nuclear aggression or the threat of nuclear aggression 
created a situation requiring "immediate action" by the 
Council (and, especially, by its permanent members). This 
would be supported by separate declarations by the three 
powers. 
The NPI' itself was submitted to the General Assembly 
in the context of the "security assurances" offer, and 
further progress on the assurances issue was implicit in 
the Treaty negotiations from that point. The three powers 
stated thei:d intentions to invite the Security Council 
irn:nediately to; a) recognise that "nuclear aggression or 
the threat of it" wauld necessitate action under the UN 
Charter, particularly by the nuclear-weapon members; 
b) welcome their intention to support assistance to any non-
nucl e ar party to the NPT exposed to nuclear aggression; 
and c) reaffirm the "inherent" right of individual and 
collective self defence under Article 51 of the Charter. 
The resultant Security Council declaration to this effect 
gave considerable weight to the argument in favour of the 
NPT. Only France failed to support the declaration, abstaining 
on the grounds that complete nuclear disarmament was the only 
adequate security guarantee. 
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a. The trechanics Of Present L'\3.:A Saferuards 
necapitulatine briefly at this point, t h ree separate I A~A 
safegua.rds regir:1.es are in operation at present: 
- those ,.!J t~blishcd under the orieinal loose rul es of 
IITFCIRC/26, on the basis of the Acency 's Statute- ( mainly 
applying to resear ch reactors); 
- those rnade subsequently under IlTFCIHC/66/::{ev. 2 to govern 
specific agreements betvreen states cJ.nd the Agerwy; 
those established for the purpose of administering 
the controls accepted by the signatories to the !TPl' 
( i e , the I.Af;A I s IrTFCIRC / 153) . 
Agreeme nts based on the firs t of these systems are now anachronisms 
and ve ry few remain in force. Those based on the second are still 
beinG made or extended ( c . r, . covering the transfer of nuclear 
rnatcriaJ s between states no t ,-iarty to the t:PT). Ho·.'feve r, the 
great bulk of the Agency's safeeuards effort since 1970 has been 
direc tcd tol'm.rds the aclf'linistration of the third system, and the 
overwh·?l r.1ing tendency is for other agreements ( e . g . between non-
signatories or , pe rh::i.ps , dealing vri.th nucl ear materials supplied 
for 'nop-cxpJ.osive ' military purposes) t o be couched in t erms 
of IHFCIHC /1 53 . Por the ~urposes of this p~per , this therefore 
wiJ. 1 be reg'.lrded as the 'current ' safeguards ree, ir;ie. 
A. -~ook-Kccping Controls 
As already me ntioned, ::1ateri:1l s accountancy is considered to 
be of " .!'unda,:1ental importance '' to safeguards , ·:rhile physical 
p.:-..ckaginc and security , ancl surve illance, are i r:1:,iortant "c·::impl ementary 
measures". In practice, continuous stocktaking (every two r:1onths 
for the r.1ost dani:e1·ous r. nteJ ·ia.ls - i.e. f ree plutoniur.i and hirhly 
e nriched uraniu~-235 , anrl ever7 six months for low-enriched U- 235 
or material contained in a nuclear reactor) :i.s the bas ic check 
a.3ainst illegal diversion . So- called "liral ts of error of 
unaccountc;d m:J. terial" (I..E1mF ) ::1re set for each sta.ee in nuclear 
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handling pl'ocedurcs and are periodical l;y rriade more st:rineent as 
t echniques i ~:1_?:!..'ove . 
'.3ec3.use of the fine lir.ii ts o: tol e:rance invol vcd, the boak- kceping 
process i s c a u s i ng minor but hie,hl y an···oyi.ne, str;J.ins far a nur.1bor 
of states . The emphasis in ~he llFi' sys tc;i1 is on th8 tir.iely 
detect i on of any materic:.ls dive rted , rather than on verification 
that r:iaterial s s up ;Jlied by or throueh the Ar,ency or for projects 
under i t s supervision have no t been put to mil itary uses ( the 
objec tive of the old systems ). States accepting FPl' controls, 
whic h they are required to administer themselves , have f ound 
that advances i n weapons tcchnoloe,y are now making it progressively 
more d i ffi cult for the;11 to neet their respons i bil i ties . For 
ex.'.1,aple , the r edefini tion of the LE:,[IV for plutonilL-:i to a 
levP.l be lo·,,, ha lf of one percent of the total throu[shput ( of a 
fuel e l ement fabrication :;>lant) i:la~' r,1ean a considerable unpla nned 
cos t in new equ i p:1en+, o.nd thP retr~1inine of staff . By accept ing 
IA:E;A safeguards , and then naking , perhaps , irreversibl e outl ays 
on nuclear facilities , stat3s ca n find the2selv es locked into a 
system nhich subsequently will :'l0an far 13reater in:r:oads into their 
independence th·1.n were orit:;ina l ly envisaged . 
rrhe blanket o.r secrecy ovtJr nuclear weapons r esearch contributes 
to the above 't;rc:' area". Stat2s sicning the lIT'T could find that 
do r:iestic resou:r-c0s or "acili tie s acq_uire a stratF!t;ic sie;nificence 
overnight :t3 n2·;1 ·.recJ.::,ons 0.re devGloped or as v1o ll-conc1:?aled research 
by one or mor3 wc::>.pons - sta tes ·01;cones public . 7.he Treaty therefore 
has cme of the :n.ost nndc;:, irablo features of any f orm of intern.'.lt ional 
c ,):i1.mit:.1e nt; ti1e lis t of obligations it entails is reJ.ativel~· 
open- end.eu . 
An ::i.rea. ::if :,f>''C i ill concern to sn.1ller stn.tes obt ,1. ininc, nuclear 
r.ia tcrio.ls oa ·;pi' ter;,s is the inequ0-tli t:, inplici t 1n the bo Jk-
k.8epi.ng arn.uuJ.,1,1[1 ts . '::he f,1·0,t,):r the throuchput of any 
nuclca~ e,3 L',.bl.i[,l't.ci,o,nt or C:) 'J[)] e x of est;=>. ':Jl ish 1ents , t he greater 
the op)ortnnit.J t::i r1iv e:1:t the q_u 1.r:ti ties nc ces . .J.ry to cons t.ruct 
a nuclea:r: dt,vi.co . Thus , a nucl~ ''.T fuel r ·"processine pl ant could 
h.1nrllci 15 0 1JC' :~c o: plutoniun anna:c..lly am} , f, iven a L~·;:ml" . or 
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such an operation of 1 percent , this would. r1ean that up to 150 Kg 
( sufficient to ;;take from 10 to 20 bombs - sec annex 1) could fail 
to be accounted for witl\_,0ut causing any wiclcspread alarm. 
Furthermore, the :nore advanced states - which tend to possess 
larger and more adve.nced nuclear establishments - are probably 
more able to ache.ive the level of process control which would be 
rcqttired to divert materials ill egally without going beyond the 
LUITJT' . The implicalion of this situation is that the smaller, 
developiniS, nations arc required to accept \7hat are, in effect, 
tighter controls than those imposed on their lar£er fellow 
signatories. 
B. Ins pectfon Controls 
Non-weapons states adherine to the NP'11 agree to accept inspe c tion 
of a ll peaceful nuclear facilities by the IAEA, at the latter's 
discretion. I f it suspects a possible illecality the Agency 
can concentrate inspec tors at any facility in the suspect nation's 
peaceful nuclear procrar:i.rno . If administered flexibly , this 
provision could help to co::ip,msate for the extra burden placed 
on smaller nations by book-kecpin~ as , presumably , frequency of 
inspecti ::rn sh)uld be directly proportionate to the potential which 
exiuts ~or illegal diversion . However , DTli'CIHC /1 53 sp;;cifies 
( in " man-years") the total allo·:r::i.i::>l e inspect ion time at any 
facility, r:ieaning that onJ.y lir:ii te d scope for "flexibility" 
exists. 
In practice, the IA.EA' s r.1ain inteTest ( in ter~s of INFCIRC /153) 
is on the flow of nucleaT r.ia t erials rather than in the oper<'l.tions 
of sp8cific establis1rne nts within cont~.act ing states. 11:,Ia t erial 
Balanc':! Areas!' ( T.DA) are de fine d by the Agency 's insp2ctors , and 
their e rrorts concentrate o~ measuring the rlo'lf of 
nuclear H.erns into, am'l out o f , these . I!'-·'CI:1C/153 ( escribes in 
det ,,il t:ie purposes and sc) pe of inspe c tio11s , and 33. t s li111i ts 
·.:>n nhCL°t ins,)ec l.·)rs need to have access to . From this point o~ 
. . + v1.e-:1, 1." is a losfJ " onen- endccl" document than IW·'CI?..<; /66/i'iev . 2, 
and this irny p-irtly o.tone "or the ti:~ndency for :1,b~ri2.ls a ccountin~ 
proccclure,; to bccom'J increasingly ricorous . In ::i.ddi tion , the 
number of E .1.~A inspectors is S'.na.J.l. (113 as at June 1978 . the trend 
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has ~2e n to keep the number of inspec tors ap;_)roxir1a tely in step 
vri th the nu:1ber of facilities subject to inspec tiou), and this 
factor pla.ces a physical lirri.it on the deerce t') which the AgP.ncy 
can intrude . 
V 
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7. 'rhe J;uclear Sunulie r States And NPI' Obli,ga tions 
Particularly since the 1960s, t he Soviet Union has found com:;ion 
ground with the olcl 'i'ripartite Gr0up in ensurinr, that outsiders were 
discouraged fron playing of: E,tst/:rest rivalries in oTder to 
,obtain nuclear vreapons . The com1')n interests of the main nuclear 
powers in ;;iaintaining the existing nuclear balance gives enoruous 
weight to in~.ernational attempts to establish effective safeguards: 
non-proliferation is probably t he only major strategic issue where 
they agree and whe r e they have an overwhelrnine interest in obtaining 
results. 
While the established nuclear-weapons states have demonstrated 
considerabl e solidarity, the somewhat larger 'club' of nuclear 
suppl i er nations has not proved to be comple tely monolithic 
on the safeguards issue. 'Fhe USA and the ussr- , paradoxically , 
have tended to find themselves aliened aeainst other suppliers at 
var ious times. A Paris/"3onn grouping, attracting t entative 
support f r om some of the other nuclear nouve~ riches (and even 
occasionally from t he UK) has t aken t he viev1 that the ~·/ashington/ 
r:Ioscow al.1iance shows str onc e lements of co!!lmercial collus ion. 
The Par.is/Bonn argument is based largely on e conomics , 
a lth0ugh the r estrictive practices employed by t he US in the 
past are also cited frequently . -:3oth counti:ies claiu the 
right to use "discernm.ent" in their sales policies, and cla im 
that they have a firm directive in t he NPT (Article IV) to 
supnly to all , and thu:::i to av:) id the mistake t he US had made in 
the 1950s and 60s of denying peaceful nuclear facilities t o 
na t ions which ·,,ould 'tlevelo:, t he technology the 1selves 11 i f 
necessary . 
While the Was hington/:.1o sc ow stance a ppears the more r easonable 
at f i r3t glance , the Euro pean reactio~1 is readily understood \'/hen 
America's past record is conside r ed . The US has supplied 
nuclear reactors to a nu;nber of non-NPT s i gnc1.tori es (Israel , 
Spain , ,?oss ibly JJakis tan) and to several other ' doubtful' cases 
(e. g . T<:gypt) . Of the twenty- nine US nucl ear cooperation 
a gr ee1:ienb , thirteen i1ere ·.vi th non-J'PT nations as at Tfarch 1975. 
'i'ho F.uropeans areued that , bec2.us0 the US , t he USSJ: and Canada 
had dispersed plutoniu:1-µrm.:.ucin;:; react '.H'S fo.irly indiscriminately, 
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they had no right to deny other nations equal sales opportunities. 
These co;npetitive aspects Josed a major threat to the ideals 
of the 1:PI' until recently, and it remains doubtful whether they 
have oeen overcome. Fro ,1 1974 through to early 1976 the NP'I' 
appeared to be directly threatened by a nur.1ber of deals between 
non-signa tory suppliers and so:-1e of the nore volatile "near-
nuclear" nations. Amonr, the ;nore notable of these ·,vas a move 
by France to sell a fuel re-processing plant to Pn.kistan in 
August 197G, despite the fact that neither Pakistan nor any other 
non-co1:1:--runist country out3ide the United States and Europe l1ad a 
de~onstrable need for such a facility (in fact, Pakistan's 
failure to sign the NPT, and the rivalry ·,-rith Inc '. ia, leave little 
dou1~t about the motivation :or the purchase, which would have 
proviued the potential to nanufacture nuclear weu.pons). 
Another particularly sensitive deal involved the sale by '.if est 
Germany of a cor1plete nucle2,r energy cycle, fTom enrich mant 
through to re-processing, to 3razil (a non-HPI' sir,natory with 
a long-standing rivalry vii th Ar0entina - a country rri th a well-
deve loped nuclear industry).* 
Initial attempts by the status quo nuclear powers and their 
sup :ior:ters to prevent sales of this t ype 'Nere singularly 
unsuccess:ul. As an extreme example, a call by the C0lombo 
Hon-aligned Conference for an oil boycott of France, for 
supplying South Africa - a typically "sensitive" near-
nuclear state - with nuclear reactors producing weapons 
grade plutonium had no ir1p::i.ct vrhatsoever. The fact that 
s aJ es such as the Franco-Pal:istan one cho-:1ed eve-i ·y sicn of 
going ahead despite both narties eventually bo·,-ring to 
* For f urther coL1ment on the ·{r:J.zilian and P;,.kistan purchases 
s e e Colu,n"bia Journal of' T'ransnat iona l Law, 1')77, Vol. 1j, 
]p . 451/452 and 459/465. 
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international pressures* to apply full I!il"CIRC/ 66/:itev. 2 safeguards 
tende d to discredit the value of IA}~A contr ols·. ror strateg ic 
and economic re'.:l. :.:; ons it se e :ried clear that Pakistan, [or example, 
w:1.nted a reproc e~sing plant to give it the potential to join 
the nuclear club. If the Pakista ni cove1·nment felt it had 
retained this pot ential even with safec,uards, then these could 
only be regarded rather cynically. 
In 1975 the nuclear "conservatives" - the USA, USSH, UK and 
Canada - ~.1ade a concerted effort to overcome the burgeoning 
problems being caused by cor'!petition arnone suppliers. This 
move was associated with other problems affecting the NP'.i' and 
is dealt with in a later section. 
* Attampts by the US to bl ock the sal e to P~~is tan i ncJuded h int s 
t ha t aid ·.rnul d be cut of': , and successful pn~ssur es on Sout h Korea 
( which had iJec n involved unier a s u bs idiary a:rrangement) to wit:1d1av1. 
Ev entua lly, these were par t i a lly s ucc e ssfu l in th;:i.t, on 9 August 1970, 
llr Ki. :s i nr,er was a ble ·.o an11our1ce that he had net:,ot i c1, t ed a saf ei;,ua r ds 
ae,roci::ien t ·:lith ?akl s t J.n to cover t he Fre nch equi p:::ient (he i 1.1plie d t hat 
t hi s a.sre :aen t had bec,n as:::;ociated •1 i t h a sal e ,f US bo:n!:>G rs to tha t 
count ry ). 
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8. The lfon-Huclear Hecipient St3.tes 
A. General Attitudes 
Ache ivement of the Tn~ itself is not necessarily viewed with 
the same opti r'l ism in L1any non-nuclear states as it is in the 
dominant nuclear poaers and their allies . Thus, India's 
1974 explosion '.:>f a"peaceful" nuclear device was generally applauded 
by the developing wm ld. (?akistan was the only developing country 
to condemn it), and. the l!P'l' is pr obably still neen by rnany as a 
device t'.:> deny developing nations weapons which the major 
developed powers either possess or have ready access to. Also, 
the "iron law of nuclear proliferation" - if one country 
confronting an adversary develops nuclear weapons, that adversary 
will da the same - still has considerable currency. Nations 
in confrontation situations could reasonably argue that their 
richt. to self-defence , defined in the UH Charter , over-rides una.er 
any com~!l i tment1' subsidiary agreements such as the NPT, and that 
the General Assembly's 'Security Assurances' cannot be taken 
seriously Yrhen the vaga:: ies of world politics are considered. 
Uany developing nations have continuing reasons to resent 
(ancl resist) what they see as efforts by the supplier nations 
- especially the 'i'Tashineton/ Otta:;ra/1.Ioscow eroup - to limit 
the spread of nuclear technology to industrialised countries. 
US sales of plutonium and weapons grade uranium to adv3.nced 
nations (includin~ Israel and South Africa) are likely to have 
proved particularJ.y offensive, when similar sales to the developing 
vrorld were consistently re £.'used , at least until the HPT. 
Against this backe,round , acheivements of the 'Treaty of the 
Prohibition of :nuclear \'lea pons in Lahli,~rM\.1t1:iica' can be seen to 
have be en a major development which/brief mention in this pa per 
as the only successful initiat ive, other th:i.n the NPT (and 
co:nparat ively min:n acheivc::ients - from a safeguards point of view -
such ;__,,s the agreencnts barrint3 nuclear wea1Jons in Antarctica 
and in outer space) to limit nuclear r1ro1iferation by international 
agreement. 
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B. r;_1he 'I'rea ty for the Prohibition of l'fuclear ·ueanons in La tin 
America: Safeguards Aspects 
'l'his, popularly knoHn as the 'Tlatelolco 'rrea ty', declares 
a nuclear 'ifeapon-free zone in "Latin America". It arose out of 
South A,1-:)rican countries' unease after the 1962 Cuban missile 
crisis and, after being si[;ned in 1967, has now been ratified 
by all Latin American nations except Cuba (Brazil considers 
that its own ratification does not have any lep,al effect until 
Cuba alsJ rati[ies). 'l'he Treaty vras endorsed by the General 
Assembly ·.vithout cliss~citing vote that year. 
'rhe basic safee;uards provision occurs in Article 13, which 
places all peaceful nuclear activittes in the zone under the 
IAEA HG-,'CIRC/ cJo/Hev . 2 rec;ine . An accompanying protocol calls 
on the four ouLide nations ( the USA, lr/, Netherlands a ,1d 
France) with tcTritories inside the zone to accept these 
restrictions also, and all but France have agreed to this. 
Within La tin Aracrica , Argentina and now "3razil are considered 
"near-nuclear" states, both being well on the way towards 
acquiring the facilities and/or materials to manufacture nuclear 
weapons . 1le i theT has ratified the l'Wr but both, along with 
all other nuclear recipients in Latin America, have accepted 
IAEA sc1fe puards as a precondition of all nuclear i ,1ports since 
1968 . The inte:rnational unease associated Yri th Brazil's 
purchase of a repmocessing plant has already been dealt vri th. 
However, there have been no reports of any violations of the 
Tlatelolco Treaty by any signatory and it must be assuned to 
be 't1or"i<ing effectively, civen the fairly limited nucle::~r 
aspirations of most South A['lerican nations up to no·;r. 
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9 . 'I'he mx.i''s Failings And l'h~ Emergence Of rrhe 'London G:r:oup ' 
During the early 1970s , Q. combination of cheap oil , relaxation 
after the acho ivement of the lfP1' , and a general conviction by 
dominant supplier countries (notably the Tinited States ) that 
safeguards were v,orkinp, reasonably v1ell and that the steady 
advance:nent of com;Jercialised nuclear energy should not be 
inter:ruptecl , contributed to a sense of inte::-·na tiona l complacency 
about the safeguards issue . From 1974 onwards , several fact ors 
have again raised the priority of nuclear safeguards . 
Firstly , t he economic impact of the 1974 oil shock - coupled 
with the polit i cal effec ts of India ' s nuclear explosion tha t 
year - created strong pressures on t he one hand to increase 
world-wide reliance on nuclear power and , on the other , to 
further restrict the availability of weapons - erade naterials . 
I ' 
Secondly , the warning that oil reserves were finite
1
been 
paralleled by simils:F' fears about future enriched uranium supplies . 
As well as '.3razil and Pakistan , a number of other countries 
shor,ed strong interest in obtaining fuel reprocessing pla nts or 
other facilities which would g ive them acce ss to weapons e;rade fuel. 
Several states sought to break the suppl ie r nations ' sb:anglehold 
on various links in t he eneTf,Y chr:1.in ( see annex 1 ). European 
nations and Japan (as well as South A"rica) ·aere working on 
their own enrichment facilities , spun·ed on by American refusal 
to release details of its enrichment process and , most 
significa ntly , the cor.niercial applicatirm of new eenerations 
of " liquid n")tal fast breeder reactors" ('.1hich would be fuelled 
by plutonium) :1nd "hiGh tempera -:ure gas-cooled :reactors" ( usinf, 
vreapons e,rade uran i ur.i) was ap~roaching . Very briefly , t raditional 
nuclear power reactors of the type s upplied by the USA and 
European na tions consumi low-enriche d uraniun ·;rhich cannot be 
used to produce bor:ibs . As an en c. product they turn out 
plutoniu:n , •;rhich ca n , as India demonstrated , be used fo r bo:nbs . 
Ho,1eve r , in the relative absence of r eprocess ing facilities, 
and with the a id of IAEA accountinr, methods , it is possibl e to 
remain f ~.1irly confident tha t this plutoniu:-:1 will not end up in 
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illegal weapons. The widespread use of uraniurrr enriched to a level 
where it could be used to make bombs, or of plutonium fuel 
which does not require reprocessing before being used it} weapons 
creates a vastly greater risk o: weapons proliferation (these 
technical aspects are dealt with :fully in thP. annex). 
Fror:i its inception, the IA.EA hr:.1.l~ hcen associated with the 
'Atoms for Peace' ideal o helping tn r:1ake nuclear materials 
and infor.nation freely ava ilable for peaceful ~ur~oses. 
"3ecause it was established to oversee the orderly transfer of 
goods which previously had been denied to all but a few states, 
its safeguards function initially was seen as auxiliary to this 
role. In accordance with its status as a I"nited Nations organ 
recipient countries still tend to regard the Agency as a forHard-
looking champion of impartial nuclear develo:1ment. This 
attitude is li~ely to be reflected vrithin the IAEA, as its 
staff consists typically of permanent officia l s who have had 
a lengthy t echnical association with the development of nuclear 
power in their own countries. 
~ 1975 conference to review the NPT (provision for such a 
review after five years to consider the o-pera~,ion of the 'l'reaty 
"with a view t .') ensuring that thA purposes of the Preamble and 
the provisions of the Treaty are being realised" exists in 
Article VIII. 3 of the HP'l1 ) tended to bring this -position to 
the surface. The need to continue to update safeeuards to neet 
new technical challenees was the dominant theme of the conference, 
with virtual consensus being reached on the value of i ~nproved 
methods and t echi1iques, the need for effective exp0rt controls, 
and the desirability of IA:;:;A safeeuards peine, made applicable 
vrith the ercatest possible uniformity. Very litt le attent ion 
was give n to the new threats beine presented by the develop'ilents 
outlined a.bmvc (impcndinereliance on weapons erade fuels,...:>~). 
Perhaps b~cu.use they were conc,cious of the Ac,ency' s bias, the 
sup plier m.ti ::ms deliberately by- p:.1.ssed t} e IAEA (and the mr) 
when they initiated a series of "secret" meetings, beginn inc; 
in London in 1975. Official co :.1r12nt when these rneetinss 
eventually carae to light was that they were directed towa:rds 
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the drafting of strict nerr rules to govern future technology 
exports-!!-. It socm becane apparent that nat ions involved - the 
'London G:r.oup' - were , in effect, rejecting the assumption that the 
NP1' had created a St!feeuards regime which 11as sufficiently 
effective to remove any reasonable risk of vrcapons proliferation. 
r he London Group has formulated its own lis t of conditions 
under which various established IAEA procedures are to be 
applied, under Agency scrutiny, to the trade and application 
of nuclear materials and technology. This is aimed at plugg ing 
a number of the r,aps in the NPT system**· In January 1978 the 
supplier countries submitted uniform "Guidelines" to the IAEA 
setting forth their safeguards conditions. This move confirmed 
that the London Group's activities will be supriortive of the 
IAEA safeguards systeL1, and are not a move away from it. 
However, it also mRans that the aereed ~\,balanced obligation's 
system accepted by NPT signatories has been superceded in some area~. 
Also, the intrusive a spects of IAEA safeguards have been increased. 
;,1e!Ylbers of the group (i.e. the USA, USSH, UK, Canada , France, ':f. 
Ger:nany, E. Gerr:1c1.ny, l3eleium, Czechoslovakia, Ita ly, J a pan, 
Netherlands, Poland and Sv1eden) have agreed to submit all nuclear 
material and equi}Yncnt they might export to established IAEA 
safeguards, and to ensure that any facility: based on knowledge 
they might export (even in non-HP'i' countries) will be subject 
to such safeguards also. Recipient states are to be required 
to protect their nuclear facilities and material in the light of 
existing IAEA recorm-aendations for physical protection (these are 
reprod.uced in the IAEA' s I.i/FCIRC/225 of FebTuary 1975), and a 
nuclear materials "blacklist" has been created involving ite:ns 
* ~.tc Jarn2 s Callaehan , :hitish ;1arlt Debates , 31 Harch 197~ , p.516 
** The Unit8J States, as a prime mover of the IfP'l' nee;otia Lions, had 
been forced to accept vrhat its chief neeotiator considered "less 
th,:m satisfactory" IA1~A safeguards and book-keeping systems in 1970 in order to obtain ·:iidest pos.,ible ratHication of the Treaty. West GeT .. 18.ny a.nd Japa n for exa:iilple had both bee n insistent that 
the far more ricorous systems proposed by the Americans ',IOuld 
be unacceptable . 
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that uan only be s upplied under exceptional guarantees . Host 
importantly, Group rnemoers have civen their support to a new 
system of onforcouent: it is implied that state s failing to adhere 
to the safeguards rules ( e • r, . by wi thdr-.J.viing from the iwr vrhen they 
have what they wa nt) will f ace a collective boycott from all 
nuclear suppliers*. 
As well as p'Jinting to the inadequacies of the 1W'1' , the London 
Group's initiatives de;nonstrate that it is easier for the advanced 
nations, with thoir supply monopoly , to dictate ter:ns to the rest 
of the world than it is for these to 1ie s e t by international law, 
despite the near-consensus that non-proliferation is a worth-
while and highly imprlrtant ai;n . 
The IAEA, as ci.n interna t.ional agency , has proved ·'fell- suited 
to drawin1:, up technical lists of safeguards and adrcJinistering these 
but has had little influence on the extension of such safeguards 
t o ne·,, -ir sensitive areas. Initiat ives from its pare nt body - the 
t;H - havo been valuable in con.f'ir:ninf international mores a nd in 
providing (with the NPT) ;:i, fra:ncwork of corrir:1it ,ents uhich, once 
established , c ci.n ;)e prog r ess ively extenn.ed. t ,::> cover all nations 
and eventu~lities . Ho·:rcver, as Irn: ia's exrtrnple demonstrated, 
the lack of effective a nd certain c8.nc t ions can mean that these 
com;'\it '.J.cmts are no± effect ive without adc:lti,nctl sup'1ort from the 
supplier n3tions . In the absence of such support, it is poss ible 
th,:i.t they create a decept ive sense ')f security arnong. the vast 
majority of "la-.-1-abiding " states , obscurine the reality that the 
few exc e ptions they allo·il (countries - like Israe l, South Africa , 
Ind i a , I'akisb.n - 11hich re fuse to sign +. he TW.!:' fo !i? example) include 
those areas where a buses are r.iost likely to occur . 
* See ITLJ Ho 1~ , -. i..Jf~C 197 j , p . 6 3 ''or a partial aceount of -the London 
croup ' s stance. A related nnil ,-i. teral ruovo h::i.s '.Jec~n the US 'Syminu,t:m 
;,:nencl1n·mt , rrhich threatc nJ to cut off ~11 econo;:iic and political aid 
t o any na.tion vi llating sa.feguanb acreeme nts . 
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1 O. 'l'he Post-L')ndon GToup Era 
1'he secrecy sur:r·oundinG the processes of the London Group 
prevents firm develo)raents f:ro:n being identified. However, it is 
significant that the nwn'.)~:r of states which h;we ratified the 
NP'l1 suddenly prolife:ratecl in 19'/.J/77 (.fro::i 75 in December 1974 
to 103 as at February 1978 - the number had renained cmnstant 
for several years). The US/USSR grouping appears to have been 
able to persuade all raajoJ: nuclear suppliers to conform with its 
tightened safeguard del:lands, and a total US freeze on the 
commercialisatlion o: fuel reprocessing ser, ms to have e ncouraged 
a slow-down in developmelhts in this area in-i:21.nationally. 
La test developrnen ts vii thin the London Group are reported to be 
directed towards the est'lblishment of LA.EA controlled multi-
lateral centres for reprocessing , and tonards the establishment of 
leasing or buy-back arranr,ornents to cover all fuel supplies to 
non-nuclear states. 
The United States, as spoke3mn for the co:1serva ti ve nuclear 
suppliers, is now stressing that mere possession of plutonium 
is an eril to be avoided: 
" ••. the basic ori.=mtation of the international safeguards 
systef!l., therefore, is a diversion fro~a the ulti:nate problem, 
which I would define as ..• a world with vast national •.• 
stores of plutonium."* 
It would seer.1 that, if these trends contj_nue, the IJu;A will be 
increasin3ly involved in ensuring that plutonium is removed fro~ 
nation~l control. 
As well as restraints on the availability of equi9;nen t .for fuel 
reprocessing, the USA - in particular - has delayed co:n.r;iercial 
a9 ""llicati'Jn of its fast breeder programrie until fail -sj,fe controls 
* ? . Leventh3.l , in Colurnhia Jom.'nal of 'l'ransnational Law, 1976 
'/ol. 16, p. :53 . 
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can be workP.d out. Both of these moves serve to deny would-be 
recipients access to nuclear equip;;ient , and therefore appear to 
violqte ArticlP. IV of the NP11 • 
11 
••• S·:) long as it is temporary 
The United States argues that 
restraint is consistent with 
Ll,e fact that under the Treaty, we :i.lso undertake to avoid steps 
that would lead to the spread of nuclear v,eapons"*(i.e . 
Article I ) Other recent Am~rican initiatives have included 
a declaration that all states receiving US r.iaterial or 
equip~ent must place their nuclear facilities under safeguards. 
In April 1978 the Carter administration froze all nuclear fuel 
exports to the EEC indefinitely, on the erounds that the 
Community's continuing programme to reprocess spent fuel was 
incompatible with US policies. 
One frequent criticism of these 'aenial" strateeies is that 
they encourage eventual proliferation by forcing thwarted 
importers to develop their own nuclear oanufacturing facilities. 
'rhis is essentially ·.vho.t happened in Europe during the 1950s and 
1960s . Another, r elated, criticism is that the political price 
is very hich compared ·:rith the limited results that can be expected . 
Nevertheless, some notable developments have occured since the 
nc;1 era of greatly increased caution and concern was ushered in by 
the nuclear conservatives. In Tiecenber 1976 France announced 
that it would cease exporting reprocessing plants, and Germany 
made a similar undertaking in June 1977. 
Ultill8.tely, countries denied access to reproces .s ing and other 
facilitie~tre likely to design their own, and the current phase 
in the development of safe0uards can therefore be viewdd as a 
race to evolve sys tens which will Fl:1.ke snch scns i ti ·m ~ i ·ea s of the 
fuel cycle as sa fc as those which are rrot subject to denial strategies. 
In October 1977 a US-sp·msored study , the ' International 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle }'.;valuation ' (I!1:!i'CE) was initiated . This 
·* J . S . lfye ' HonproJ.iferc1tio:1: A Lont_; -'i1er r!l St rater,y ' in ?ore ir;n Affairs 
April 1978, pp 610/611 
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is vrorking towards a new system of nuclear cooperat ion involving 
international fuel stockpiles and spent fuel repositories, 
inte rnational enrichment facilities, and international reprocessing 
facilities. 
It is not clear what, if any, relationship the IrTFCE will 
have vrith the IAEA. However, its objectives appear 
complementary to those of the Agency:, and imply a continuing and 
expanding role for safeguards. Essentially it is an attempt 
by the nuclear pagers to build a consensa3 with the non-nuclear 
ones and to minimise the trend tovrards confronjration caused by 
the current policies of restricting supply. 
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Conclusion 
The development of the present safeguards system essentially 
reflects an overwhelr.iing desire by those vrnrld powers which 
possess nuclear weapons, supported by their allies, to deny 
these to other nations. As a corollary to having this 
objective enshrined in international law they have been prepared 
to offer various concessions. However, where it has become 
evident that these concessions could eventually contribute to 
nuclear proliferation, they have been hastily vlithdrawn. 
Among the nuclear recipients is a significant body of states 
which do not necessarily have the same perception of nuclear 
proliferation as that of the nuclear 'haves'. A primary 
purpose of the various safecuards regimes is to ensure that 
these ns\tions are not able to deviate from the attitudes 
and codes of behaviour dictated by the dominant group. 'i'i'hile 
the desirability of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons 
appears superficially to be an established inte r national more 
the very str ingency of the present nuclear safeguard~; is 
tacit recognition that those states whose strater;ic situation 
could benefit from a nuclear arsenal are very likely to 
attempt to acquir~ one. 
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Annex l. 
Nuclear Power Generation Technology. 
l • ?Tuclear ?i3sion 
Uranium, the basic fuel of the present generation of 
nuclear power reactors, occurs as a mixture of two main 
•isotopes• or elemental forms with ide~tical che~ical 
but significantly different physical properties. one 
::, f these iso ~es (U-235) makes up only O. 77% of natural 
1t~3nlum (which is primarily U-238) but it is this rare 
form which is consumed in nuclear reactors. ExtractiotJ. 
of the U-235 is by far the most difficult and exnensive 
ota~o ln the production of nuclear fuel ele~ents and, 
at; rr,,se:1 r,, ou:!.y tL<: U .s .A., iJSSR 2:1d China hav~ been 
ahle to do this commercially. 7his means that, while 
u rnn:L11:n ore is found in a lar?;e number of countries, only 
th e-: t hre~ do:nina:it military -powers are able to produce 
n--235. 
In practise, al though a tom bo i:ibs require ura-:,.ium which 
has !wd its U-235 content 11 enriched 11 up to 90-:-~ or more 
( 11 weApons grade" uranium), most :rnclear po'11e:6 statio:is 
ara designed to operate at an enrichment level of only 
a b,1u t y~ TJ-235 ( enricht!lent even to this level requires 
v :Lr tnally the sa:ne facilities as those required to 
produce weapons grade ura:iium). However, when U-235 
mixAd with large quantities of ordinary uranium undergoes 
fission in a nuclear power reactor it converts much of this 
in to plutonium, a separate eleme:1 t ·.vhich is i tseli' very 
suitable for the prod~ction of nuclear weapons. 
Separation of plu td.nium fro:11 the oth er end-pr·'.)d•..1c ts of 
ur~ni~~ fission is consid erably more simple than ura~i~m 
~nrich~ent, and the nu~~er J f cou~tries possessi~g the 
facilities to do this is increas"Ln::; fairly ra?idly. 
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2. 'Tttclear T;,2actor:::; 
There are two main types of nucl ear power raactor 
in co:n:nerc ial operation at present: the so-called 11ligh t 
water reactors 11 (VHRs), which are produced in the U.S.A.. 
and Europe; a , d 11 heavy water reactol's" Ur.vRs) which are 
marketed by Canada. The essential difference bet..-1ween 
the two types is fuels: V!/"2s require uranium which has 
h een enriched to about 3?~ U-235, whereas H'HRs are. able 
t~ use natural uranium. A third type of reactor, the 
" ht6h tenpera ture gas - cooled reactor' (RTGR) > which 
·l D 1rnder,-soing extensive develop:nen t in the rJ .S. a:1d 
F:•.trope, consur.1es weapons grade (90'~ enriched) uranium 
and is likely to become considerably more common with-
:L n the next. decade. 
The r e l~tive efficiency of the various types of reactor 
iG of considerable significance to any c ountry endeavouring 
to obtain nucl8ar po~er generating facilities, and is dire~tly 
related to the degree of enrichment of the fuel. 
a Gin. .,~ :1a t1Jral :1raniu:n, are able to extract only about 1 % 
of the eneq~y theoretically available. LWRs have a higher 
net efficiency (about 32~), while HTGRs are able to achieve 
a net e:ffic "Lency of 40??,. An i~portant consideration 
b ~aring on efficiency is the size of the reactor, as 
cuntrolu in the U .s. and some oth·.?:r countries limit most 
reactors to a maxi~um fission rate of 3300 Mw. This :neans 
that the largest L'?R available will only be able to supply 
p1.trhaps 1200Mw (about 32?-6 of 3300) whereas a HTGR of the 
same size would would be able to produce 1500 Mw5 of 
electricity. 
~ach type of r eactor produces a different range of end 
prod 1 cts, and not all on these ~re suitable f ) r the :::ianu-
facture of nuclear weapons. As mentioned above, L~Rs 
( which use 11 safe11 low - eariched uranium) p::-oduce lart; e 
qi..:an tities of uluto ~!i'.l!n , the -princiral ingredj_e:1t in rnost 
n _iclear 1.'ieano,1s. H'!ms, using equally s a fe na tura 1 urani ·J:.1, 
also pr~duce plutonium. On th e other hand, Pf~Rs (using 
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·u eapo,;" grade uraniur..:· cons•Jme their fuel co .:?ple tely a,:d 
do not ~rod~ce any fissionable end ?roducts . 
3. Nucle3r ~uel Cycles 
V/hil e the three do i:1i1~a::1 t military powers have a mo:1opoly 
only over uranium enric rLne~ t, there are s-9veral other s ta ·:r,es 
in tb.e rirod '-1ction of nuclear reactor fuel where - - -~-- s11aller 
:~ oun tries have been d~·nied ace ess to esse:1tial technolo1gy. 
nlao, theta are certain areas in the nuclear fuel production/ 
:1tilisation cycle where w~a9ons gradi materials become avail-
? ~1le, and ~h0re the supplier nations (and the i~ternational 
c ,.1 :nr.11nli t:r) lia.ve an interest in imposing stri:1ge;1 t co ~trols . 
Ut·aniu;n ore is nor:nally concentrated to 11 ye1 ~.owcake" 
( (;ru.de uranium oxide) in the country where it is :-nined. 
This is a vary simple process. ~he next stage in the 
p1·,Jdl.lction of pure uraniT:1 is also si;1}ple, and involves the 
Ji~esti on of the yellowcake to obtain uranium hexafluoride. 
811richm~nt of gaseous uraniu~ hexafluoride icl the third, 
0t:1~r stage:-:; involvin~ adva: ,1ced 
t ec hno logy are the produc ti ".)!l of fuel rods and the reprocess-
ing of spent fuel to separate unused ~-235 fro~ the plut6nium 
end urod•ict.~ All stages ':nay be shown diagra:natically as 
f ::: l lows~ 
,ootn,) t0. : ~ A further si:age in the cycle, 11 liqrl.d metal fast b:eeeder 
reactors" (LMFBRs ) is .now being developed. These will 
c c>nsune plutonium produced by L~Rs, and large quantities 
of -plutonium no•:, in storage will be disposed of i!i this way. 
'l'he first ex:Jeri:ne!1 tal LV?S~ cac. e on streain in the USSR in 
1972 but France and the U.?. are now the \'.fOrld leaders in 
this fieJ d, with co:nmerd.al pla'.1. ts plan n2d for the e.e.rly 
193o •s (b&th countries are actively soliciting orders). 
~opan and~ . ~ . Ger~3ny are also believed to be ahead of the 
rr .s.A. in this field but all three c0~ctries are working on 
d e :r:onst:r:=i tion '!)lants. 
J 
t 
er.La 
ent i. :w 
tra ll c.1 
iil 
d1 
53 
(no ~ co ri ..,,l ··1i· ~ t- "OU •· -'-r; 0 ~ \ • L.L- ·- -~ l .. .. 0::,...,...., ll, .-. , ... ..:, .' 
}1i lliri.g to 
'Ye 110·,·,ca:rn' 
Where convenient. 
ChE::nical 
co nvers::.on 
to :Tra:i.ium 
I-Texafluoride 
~here convenie~t. 
currently: 
' 
Enrich.men t to 
y~ 'fJ-235 
U.S.A. only 
tra l A r r- . P e p . 
,ark 
Canada 
France 
U.K. 
USA. 
and 
n 
ea 
ico 
ar 
t 16al 
Hricri. 
b 
den 
key 
.A. 
oslavi ,:i. 
TJ.S.A. 
Gcr1:1any 
France 
TJ • !,. • 
Japan 
Belgium)no long er 
Italy ) operatin5 
Pakistan (planned) 
Brazil(planned) 
I:--tdia 
Belgium 
Fra!llce 
Ger~any 
Jtaly 
Japan 
~retherlands 
S.:pain (planned 
Sweden 
Tf •or' 
TT .S .A. 
Plutonium 
S to:::·.3_c3e 
Fuel 
?.eproc essing 
' 
salvaz;.~p "?ual. 
conversion to 
FissiJnable Porn 
(oxide) 
TJ.S.A. or where 
convenient 
Production of 
Fuel Rods. 
L ','/ R 
Power Station 
\Y l/l,W LIBRARY 
VICTOR.LA UNl'IERSI v1here wea:pon::,-~radc ma t cr-ial :Ls <'!Vailable. ' TY OF WELLINGTON 
J 
l 
' 
54 
The develop~ent of HTGRs has been held back by U.S. 
r2 l ucta~ce t o d i vert or ex port w0aDo~s srade uranium but 
s0vc~o l ~uro9ean fir~s have pro duc ed working r eactors , a nd 
a ,1 A ;:; 2.ric an fj_rm - the Seneral A toc1ic Co. - =~a,iu fac t 1.lres thes::: 
for the do~~stic ~arket. '::'h2 PTGR fuel cycle is as follows: 
I urani:.i:•: 
l r:iicing y ellowcal-~ 9 ' ,, 
" 
.,__ 
fuel r H'rGR 
f abricat- r , 
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tlth0ush ~T3~ s u3e hi~hly e~r iched 1-235, in practise 
this is tliluted with a nu~ber of inart products (graphite, 
silic~~ carbide, thorium) at the fuel fa~~icati~n stage. 
To r<)cover about 15rCg of \•1e2.pons grade rr-235 ( e.!lough for 
~ ni..J.clear bo:nb) from HTGR fuel rods r:;}portedly v10uld 
involve the diversion of about four tonnes of these, and 
would also involve a consid~rable technical effort. r,rom 
t}ie fuel fabrication stage onwards, the HTGR is therefore a 
•rery satisfactory means of ge~erating electricity with 
r;! l :d!':!U!'.!l nuclear risk. 
~nrich~ent, the most difficult stage in either of the 
t 1:10 cycles, has been :nainly a TT .S. i;ireserve up to now 
( a lthou g h the Soviet Union has competed openly for sales 
of low-e~riched uraniu~ to Burope and Japan sin~e 1972). 
Tfnt.il now, commercial enrichme!'l.t has b e en by the saseous 
di. ffnsi0 n :uethod which was developed during 1.'fr:::irld \l}ar II. 
This tr.e thod is known to demand extren~ely large in:pu ts of 
e ·!oct ric pJwer and capital. A shortage of enrich~ent 
raciJ.ities, cou ~lcd with the ~.S. refusa l to release 
·:!i::taL ls o f th e djffusion -process, has e.:ico•Jra~ed S"':)veral 
o t:.er advanced nations to i :west ceavily in e nrich :-::ent 
r ;)883.rch. As well as variations of the diffusion process, 
o n,:: ·.'/ s~:stem - the gas certrif'..tge process - has now been 
d eveloped in ~urope. 
•rwa ~uropean cons~rtia are now constructing large 
enrich~e:i.t facilities. UR:S ~rc O ( TJ • re .; F. q. r;e~a :1y; 
~r~ th orlands) is building ce~trif~ge plants at Alnelo in 
~To llnnd and cape ~t hurst in the iJ . Y ., while Eurodif (?r.'.3:-ice; 
'l.elgiu~1; I .a.ly; s ·£win ; .ru:;ian; IrcJ.n) is building a 
diff~s io~ plant at ~ricasti n in 7 r3nce, and has tentative 
p l~ns for a seco!ld ins:allation. Both grou ps hope to 
b e in ?r·Jduc t i 0::1 by tt.:: early 1 93')' s. south Africa is 
c ·J:1.stru-:: ting a s·~all s :, r i ch ::2-:t :;> l ant based on ·w}:at is 
c l a i rn::d to oe local technol'.J 2S, and s8':1!eral other co'..l nt ries 
(Br a7,il, ,T.:1 "9an, Iran, J\,.,stralia) ha·:e all sl-0·:1!1 int er8st 
i.r. ha':in5 th eir own -c :r ich::i~:1t f3cil ities , dene 1ding 
:1non th ei r abilities to at tract foreign techn'.Jlo~y and 
(in the case of 3razil ond A~s t ralia) ca~ital. 
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r;o itel e le:ne!1 t fabrication does not dema?.d advanced 
t c::chnology or :iass i.ve capital invest;,1e:1t but does require 
;, nkilled WJrk force and verj strict quality control. 
At l ·~ast n:lne non-com!lunist count:i:ies have been able to 
manufacture fuel ele~e~ts, a!1d Spain is now establishing 
a '.,lan t. 
Fuel renrocessing units are manufactured by the rr.s., 
?ranee, r. .n. ~er:"t!any, the rr . 1-'.: . and ,Ja?a:i. Several other 
c o ,mtrie.3 . (Pakistan, Brazil) either have obt~lned, 
or are in the process of obtainin3, repr~cessing equipment 
from the s!..lpplier !1ations, and rece!1t press reports 
j _ nd -L~a te t1~n t Taiwan may have either built or purchased 
a clandostine plant of its own. Any efficie~t reprocessing 
plant is believed t~ have the ca~acity to ha~dle the fuel 
from up to f~rty nuclear power s 1:a tio!1s, :nea:i.ing tr.a t few 
countries caa justify t he expe ~s e in ?~rely eco3o~ic terms. 
l~. Nuclear Ex~losions 
There are three ~ain fissionable ~aterials which are known 
to b~ suitable for the prad~ction of nuclear weap0ns: two 
isotopes of uranium, and plutoniu~. 
lf-235 (the naturally-occurring Qinor isotope which ~ust 
bP. concentrated in the enrich~ent !)recess). For practial 
p nrposes, the minir.n.mi enrichr:ien t level ~ecessary to prod 1 ce 
lf-2j5 for a nuclear ex9losio~ wo~ld ~robably be around fifty 
perc e nt (when about 50 ~ g would be required). 
U-233. ~his isotop e can only be obtained i~ special 
nucl ear reactors. It always contains q~antitics of a 
third isow::ie 1.vhich is highly radioactive, and is extre:::iely 
<la~gero~s and difficult to wor~ wi th. For these reasons, 
i1nd beca~se of its ccarcity, it is ~ot co~sid e red i~ this 
Pluto nium is prod~ccd in th e vast ~ajority of com~ercial 
p o·:,er rca c t )rs. It is not dans :-) rous to •.•ror!<: with (i.e. it 
i s~ 't dan;srously radio3 ctive but is very poiso~ous). The 
critical :nass 0[ plutoni ,1. :.1 needed to -cr::>d. •.tce a 'tucl e ar 
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e :.cole>si,)n :i.s believed te> ' ' e ab:m t 3 
n-235. 
or half that of pure 
~bile much ~f the infor~ation on nuclear weapon ~anufact-
ure re'Tlai:is cL:issified, a :_ar;e number of te-xts clai:n that 
this is a relatively si~ple procedure which is well within 
the canabilities of r.iost natians (e.g. 11Und3r conceivable 
c ircu::ista~1ces, a few perso!"ls, passibly even one per·son 
~0rking alone, who possessed about tea kilograms of pluton-
i11m oxide and a sabstatial a~ount of chemical high explosive 
.~ .rnld, within several weeks, design and b'..tild; a crude 
f tssion bo::1b" - '.'!illrich & Taylor, PP~ 20/21). 
Essentially, a nuclear explosion appears to result 
wl1en any ,)ne of the three fissionable materials ~entioned 
n U·'J'.fe reaches "critic al mass11 , i . .:::. a size wher& the number 
of nei.t trons (radioactive decay particles) passing through 
a ~iven volume of plutonium or uranium is safficient to 
set 8ff a chain raaction. A number of refinements exist 
to reduce the qaa:1 ti ties of uranium or pl:.t tonium req"-lired. 
These include co~pression inside an ordinary chemical 
explosion, a ~d encasing the nuclear material in a 
11 reflector" of sa::ne sort. Such techniques are believed 
to allo~ nuclear weapons containing a s little as 4 Vg of 
pluto niu~ to be rnan~factured, and it is probable that research 
has (or will ) reduced the quantities required even f arther. 
The average L'i1R produces about 200 Kg of plutonium 
annually, and it is esti~ated that between 15 OOO a~d 
20 OOO Kg of plutonium will be i n storage in the U.S. alone 
h y 1977. The quantity of fissionable ~aterLal which would 
need to be diverted ~ro~ a nuclear reactor by a govern~ent 
in t e ndi!, .?-; to :!)rodu(; e a nuclear •:;ea-:Jon is therefore co-n ::-a_ri t-
) 
ively s ~a ll. ~ 
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